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Abstract 
 
Does democracy make politicians accountable? And which role does information play in the 
accountability process? There are several reasons making the 2009 UK expenses scandal an 
ideal setting to answer these questions. Our study of the scandal reaches two main 
conclusions: 1) the removal of corrupt politicians happens mostly at the pre-election stage; 2) 
information availability is a crucial ingredient in the accountability process. We also show 
that punishment was directed to individual MPs rather than their parties and that voters 
displayed a substantial partisan bias, not only at the voting stage but also by perceiving co-
partisan MPs to be less involved in the scandal.  Ceteris paribus, female MPs attracted more 
press coverage and, for the same amount of coverage, were more likely to stand down. 
Finally, we show that press coverage was ideologically balanced, i.e., newspapers with 
different ideological leaning devoted similar amount of news to each MP.  
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1. Introduction 
An important function of democratic systems is to make public officials accountable 
to citizens.
3
  This control works through the incumbents’ fear of the next election and by 
offering voters the opportunity to “throw out the rascals”. A substantial theoretical literature 
has used the principal-agent model to formally investigate these ideas in an attempt to clarify 
what makes officials accountable and, ultimately, how politicians’ behaviour can be aligned 
with citizens’ interests.4 Asymmetric information between citizens and policy-makers is a key 
ingredient of these models and an abundant literature has highlighted both theoretically and 
empirically the importance of information availability for keeping public officials 
accountable.
5
 
Although most theories tend to study accountability mechanisms by focussing on a 
simplified voter-politician relationship, democratic processes rely on a number of actors who 
often play a crucial role in the process of “throwing out the rascals” in practice. The political 
punishment of corrupt politicians calls into question the functioning of party organizations, 
the information available from mass media, voters’ awareness of political matters and their 
eventual response in the ballot box. Voters’ choices are in turn mediated by their perceptions 
of events and by partisanship: first, heterogeneous prior beliefs can induce different 
perceptions of corruption even if voters receive similar information; second, when choosing 
whether or not to punish corrupt politicians, voters may trade off valence issues with 
ideological considerations. Without a systematic empirical exploration of these channels, our 
understanding of the functioning of democratic accountability remains in “reduced form”.  
The scandal that erupted in the United Kingdom (UK) in May 2009 concerning MPs’ 
abuse of expenses allowances constitutes an ideal setting to study accountability channels in 
some detail and to identify the causal links at play.  First, the scandal involves a well-defined 
set of political actors, namely the members of parliament (MPs) who were in office in May 
2009, who all faced the same rules and constraints regarding their expenses. Second, the 
scandal erupted within a very short time frame for all MPs involved and focused on the same 
issue for all MPs, namely abusing the allowance system. These two features make scandal 
involvement comparable across MPs and provide a marked identification advantage compared 
to either cross-country studies or studies that, even within a country, compare scandals which 
                                                
3 According to William Riker, for example, “the function of voting is to control officials” (Riker 1982, p.9). 
4 For a synthesis of this literature, see Besley (2006).  
5We will discuss related literature and place our contribution into the big picture in the discussion in Section 7.  
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occurred in different periods, concerning different sorts of political actors and different types 
of wrongdoing. Moreover, the scandal was salient in public debate for several months and it 
was followed by an election only one year after it began. 
Following the scandal, an investigation was held that led to an accurate reconstruction 
of the amount misappropriated by each MP in the February 2010 “Review of past ACA 
payments” (hereafter “the Legg report”). This provides another characteristic of the scandal 
that makes it particularly suitable for empirical study: the availability of an objective, 
accurately defined measure of monetary wrongdoing. Finally, it is reasonable to assume that 
MPs could not have anticipated the level of detail at which information on their expenses was 
eventually offered to the public. Although aggregate expenses were already publicly available 
since 2004 because of the Freedom of Information Act (2000), each individual claim became 
public after May 2009: this information was leaked to the Daily Telegraph by a ‘mole’ 
working for a contractor in Whitehall in exchange for a payment of 110,000 pounds. The 
House of Commons even appealed for a criminal investigation about the leak. Hence, it 
would have been hard to forecast the events of May 2009, which makes them a genuine shock 
that can be used for identification purposes: if the scandal was hard to forecast, then 
revelations on individual MPs’ usage of their allowance provides accurate information about 
politicians’ type and how likely they are to be corrupt in the future, which is what matters if 
voters are prospective.
6
 
Compared with existing studies of the electoral punishment of corrupt politicians, 
usually focussing on a single mechanism, our empirical analysis takes the complexity of the 
accountability process into account and studies the scandal from a variety of angles. The 
conceptual framework that we bring to the data, illustrated in Figure 1, puts together in a 
simple way ideas that have been rigorously scrutinized both by economists and political 
scientists. The classic works of Barro (1973) and Ferejohn (1986) lay the foundation of 
political agency models, where politicians are regarded as agents of a representative principal 
(for example the median voter in a Downsian model). Asymmetric information plays a key 
role in all principal-agent models and it becomes then natural to extend the simple political 
agency model by endogenizing information supply, hence introducing the mass media. A 
model along these lines can be found for example in Besley and Prat (2006). This raises 
questions about the accuracy of information supply and the possibility of media bias which 
has also been extensively scrutinized using both rational choice theory and behavioural 
                                                
6 We provide background information on the MPs’ expenses scandal in the Appendix. An excellent overview of 
the events is also provided in chapter 1 of VanHeerde-Hudson (2014). 
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economics (see for example Mullainathan and Shleifer 2005 and Gentzkow and Shapiro, 
2006). This bias could be supply driven like in the model of Baron (2006)
7
, or demand driven, 
for example because of cognitive dissonance, like in Mullainathan and Shleifer (2005). In 
either case pre-existing partisanship is a key variable and may induce journalists to treat co-
partisan politicians more leniently and voters to give lower weight to corruption news 
involving ideologically closer representatives.
8
        
 
[ FIGURE 1 APPROX. HERE] 
 
To simplify, we have three key steps in our accountability framework of Figure 1: 1) 
following revelations of politicians’ misbehaviour9 media outlets decide how much coverage 
to devote to the event and specifically to each politician; this is likely to be the main channel 
(although not necessarily the only one) through which citizens learn about the abuses; with 
respect to this link we will ask questions about possible media bias and the role performed by 
media outlets as watchdogs of power; 2) citizens process received information and update 
their beliefs; perception of a politician’s wrongdoing can be mediated by a number of 
individual characteristics, and notably by partisanship: we now ask how partisanship and 
other individual characteristics affect the way news are processed and incorporated into 
perceptions about politicians; 3) changed perceptions may lead to action, whereby voters 
punish corrupt politicians in the ballot box, or expected punishment induces politicians to 
stand down (or political parties to remove them). We also indicate with a direct arrow the fact 
that public outrage can induce politicians to step down even in the absence of a future election 
(for example Nixon during his second mandate as US president). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
7 See also the evidence in Larcinese et. al (2011), particularly their discussion of the case of the Los Angeles 
Times.  
8 For a model of the impact of ideology on information acquisition, see Larcinese (2009). 
9 We use the word “corruption” as a general term referring to a misalignment between the voters’ preferences 
and the politician’s actions. In our specific case this consists of the abuse of the expenses allowance system by 
some MPs. 
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This paper analyses these links in reverse order, starting from the final outcomes and 
moving back to media coverage, trying also to quantify their relevance in the accountability 
process. A constant theme in our analysis is the contrast between media reporting and the 
actual monetary damage to taxpayers as gauged by the Legg report. Our conclusion is that 
what matters for voters’ punishment is only the former, although media coverage is also 
partially explained by the amount of money misappropriated. 
We find that an MP’s scandal involvement, when measured by media coverage, led to 
a higher probability to leave Parliament in 2010. On the other hand, the monetary measure of 
wrongdoing does not relate to the probability to remain in Parliament. Scandal-related media 
coverage both compelled the most involved MPs to stand down and reduced the voting share 
of standing MPs. We run placebo regressions to show that post-scandal media coverage does 
not predict pre-scandal retirements and does not predict 2001-2005 changes in vote shares. 
We also find that voters’ punishment was directed to individual MPs rather than their parties: 
while the incumbent party was punished when a sitting MP was involved in the scandal their 
party was not punished in constituencies where MPs decided to stand down. Punishment of 
corrupt politicians in the ballot box, in any event, was not overwhelming and did not reduce 
their chances to be re-elected. Our conclusion is that what drives the accountability process is 
media coverage of the scandal rather than the amounts actually misappropriated by individual 
MPs and that most of the impact happens at the candidacy stage: hence focussing on electoral 
returns without considering the selection of candidates would underestimate the capacity of 
democracy to “throw out the rascals”. 
 We then use the British Election Study 2010 panel to gain some understanding of 
what drives voters’ perception of wrongdoing and how perceived involvement relates to 
actual voting behaviour. The perceived involvement of an MP turns out to be well explained 
by actual wrongdoing (as measured by the Legg report), but also by a few individual 
characteristics of the respondents: education and trust in other people, for example, are both 
negatively associated with MP’s perceived involvement, even when we restrict our attention 
to within-constituency variation (i.e., focussing on voters’ heterogeneity for given levels of 
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misappropriation and media coverage).
10
 Punishment in the ballot box (in the form of a 
changed vote between 2010 and 2005) is directed to MPs who are perceived by their 
constituents to be involved in wrongdoing. We show, however, that partisanship plays a 
particularly important role in the accountability chain: perceived involvement of an MP is 
reduced, ceteris paribus, when the MP belongs to the political party the respondent feels 
closer to.  
Given its importance in the accountability process we then turn to media coverage of 
the scandal. We find that the British press acted mostly as a watchdog. Controlling for the 
pre-scandal press coverage of each MP, we find that MPs who were later recognized by the 
Legg report as more heavily involved were also more heavily covered by the press on 
average. Ceteris paribus, government members and frontbenchers of the main opposition 
party were more likely to be covered (in relation to the scandal) than backbenchers. We find 
no detectable partisan coverage, in the sense that patterns of coverage of specific newspapers 
do not appear to be related to their political leaning. Other variables turn out to be more 
important: for example, female MPs have, ceteris paribus, received more scrutiny than their 
male colleagues. 
MPs’ personal characteristics did not matter in general, with the exception of gender: 
ceteris paribus, punishment has been heavier for female MPs. Hence, along with our findings 
on media coverage, we uncover a consistent pattern showing that female MPs were generally 
more vulnerable subjects during and after the scandal. 
Not all links in Figure 1 are estimable with our data; in particular, we are unable to 
estimate the impact of the expectation of punishment on candidates’ decisions to stand down 
(or on their de-selection). We indicate with solid arrows those links that we will be able to 
quantify and will report the estimates in Figure 3 at the end of our empirical analysis. One 
advantage of our comprehensive approach to democratic accountability is that we will be able 
to provide some estimates in reduced form (for example a direct link from media coverage to 
voters’ punishment) and then delve into the mechanism by using survey data (which will 
allow us to estimate all the intermediate steps). 
We present and discuss the data in Section 2 and our results in the Sections from 3 to 
5. We then provide an overall assessment of the accountability process and attempt to 
quantify the overall effects in Section 6. Section 7 discusses our findings, relates them to 
existing literature, and illustrates how they contribute to our understanding of the role played 
                                                
10 Following the norm in British politics we call “constituency” the electoral district. 
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by elections and the press in keeping public officials accountable. Further background 
information on the scandal and summary statistics are reported in the Appendix. 
 
 
 
 
2. The data 
Our study begins with extensive data collection, as well as bringing together a number 
of existing sources. Our main explanatory variable is the media salience of the coverage of the 
scandal for each individual MP. Data about media coverage of MPs were gathered using a 
series of searches on the Nexis database of UK newspapers. The research compiled data from 
seven UK newspapers (including the Sunday editions): the Daily Telegraph, The Guardian, 
The Times, The Independent, The Sun, Daily Mail, and the Scotsman. The sample of 
newspapers was selected to include widely read national broadsheets and widely read national 
tabloids, along with an important regional newspaper (the Scotsman), as well as in order to 
have sufficient ideological variety.
11
 
To gauge the media salience of each individual MP’s involvement in the expenses 
scandal we use the number of articles in which an MP’s name appears alongside the word 
“expenses” in the period from 8 May 2009 to 7 August 2009 (i.e. for three months after the 
Telegraph revelations).
12
 However, since some MPs naturally had a higher profile, and 
therefore attracted more coverage, whether related to scandal or not, we also count the 
number of articles in which the MP’s name appears during the three months preceding the 
scandal. To facilitate the interpretation of our coefficients we use the natural logarithm of 
both variables
13
 and call them news-post and news-pre respectively. Our estimates are based 
on the idea that, controlling for news-pre, news-post captures the media salience of each MP 
in relation to the scandal. 
The other key explanatory variable is represented by an objective measure of 
wrongdoing expressed in monetary terms from the Legg Report. We acknowledge that the 
seriousness of each individual misappropriation cannot be entirely captured by its monetary 
value. At the same time, the amount of money misappropriated is an important dimension of 
                                                
11 Readership of UK newspapers for 2009-2010 is summarized in the Appendix using National Readership 
Survey (NRS) estimated data. 
12 We use the frequency as a proxy of the salience, instead of coding the discursive content of the articles (e.g., 
Negrine and Bull 2015).  
13 log(N+1), where N is the number of articles. 
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the scandal and it should be of concern for voters. From a practical point of view, this 
indicator represents the only objective measure of malfeasance available. We use the natural 
logarithm of this variable and call it Legg-money.
14
  
Our analysis includes control variables for individual MPs extracted from the 
PublicWhip website: party, front or backbench status at various dates, incumbency status in 
2005, gender, age, university degree (and in particular whether an Oxford or Cambridge 
graduate), seniority (using the year in which the MP was first elected to Parliament), and 
distance in miles from the MP constituency office to Westminster. To run placebo 
regressions, we collect analogous information for the 2001-2005 parliament.
15
 Data were also 
collected on the date that Members stood down or were deselected, using a number of online 
sources and local newspapers: we identified 65 MPs who announced their decision not to seek 
re-election in 2010 before the publication of detailed expenses, whilst 87 retired or were 
deselected after 8 May 2009. Finally, for each MP, votes cast in parliament were categorized 
as ‘loyal’ when the MP voted along with her/his party, ‘rebel’ when she/he did not, and 
‘absent’ when the MP missed a vote. The frequencies for loyal, rebel, and missed votes were 
collected for each MP for two periods: the year prior to the scandal (8 May 2008-7 May 
2009); and the time from the start of the scandal to the dissolution of Parliament (8 May 
2009-12 April 2010). 
To make reliable conclusions about differences in electoral returns between the 2005 
and 2010 polls, we include information from Rallings and Thrasher (2007). There was a 
wholesale adjustment of constituency boundaries in England, Wales, and Northern Ireland 
(but not in Scotland) between general elections. The notional boundary changes developed by 
Rallings and Thrasher (2007) were used to identify constituencies in which there were minor 
adjustments and would thus provide more reliable estimates of changing electoral behaviour. 
Our baseline estimates refer to constituencies whose boundaries changed by 10% or less. We 
conduct several robustness checks by varying maximum boundary changes.
 16
   
We omitted a number of MPs from our analysis. The party leaders for the three main 
political parties at the time of the expenses scandal and Speaker of the House Michael Martin 
were excluded, since they were mentioned frequently in newspaper reports independently of 
                                                
14 The amount of money reduced on appeal is subtracted from that recommended by the Report.  
15 We updated the data of Besley and Larcinese (2011), which were collected for MPs elected in 2001. To allow 
a difference-in-difference analysis of electoral impact between the 2005 and 2010 general elections, we collected 
information on the MPs who were elected in the 2005 general election (and in 2001 for the placebo regressions) 
and identified individuals who have run in the same constituencies in both  elections.  
16 Percentages refer to the voters, not the physical boundaries of the constituencies. 
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their own expenses. We also omit the four MPs from the House of Commons who were under 
police investigation at the time of the Legg Report, since they were not included in the audit.  
We have used two datasets: the first merges our data with electoral results data 
compiled by Pippa Norris
17
 to create a constituency-level dataset. The second is obtained by 
merging our data with the 2010 British Election Survey (BES) internet panel data, which 
records the electoral constituency of each respondent. Robustness checks have been 
conducted by using the BES 2005-10 panel data, which have the advantage that questions 
about individual predispositions and party identification were asked before the scandal, but 
the disadvantage of attrition and smaller sample size. Detailed description and summary 
statistics for all variables are reported in the Appendix. 
 
3. The electoral consequences of the scandal  
Were politicians involved in the scandal punished by the electoral process? We begin 
by analysing the key outcome of the accountability process: whether scandal involvement 
explains the likelihood to leave parliament. We will then move to a more detailed 
consideration of the accountability mechanism by distinguishing between MPs who decided 
to stand down and MPs that stood for re-election. 
 
3.1 Throwing out the rascals 
Does scandal involvement correlate with the probability of not being in parliament 
after the 2010 election? We answer this question by estimating the following equation: 
 
                                                                         (1)                                            
 
where       is a dummy variable equal to 1 if MP i is not in parliament after the 2010 
election. Involvement in the scandal is measured in two ways: the first is by using news-post, 
controlling for news-pre; the second is by using Legg-money. We also introduce a vector of 
control variables    to account for other factors that may determine the probability to leave 
parliament. Columns 1 and 2 of Table 1, where we report simple regressions without control 
variables, show that scandal-related news coverage is positively and significantly correlated 
with the probability of leaving parliament, while the amount of money misappropriated is not. 
In column 3, we include both indicators and again news-post displays a positive and 
                                                
17http://www.hks.harvard.edu/fs/pnorris/datafiles/British%20General%20Election%20May%202010/British_Par
liamentary_Constituency_General_Election_2010_Version_5.xlsx 
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statistically significant coefficient. This conclusion is not substantially altered when we 
control for MPs and constituency characteristics, although the magnitude of the estimated 
coefficient is now smaller. A 1% increase in news-post (controlling for news-pre) leads to 
about 0.03% higher probability of being out of parliament after the 2010 election. 
The coefficients estimated in Table 1 suggest that the probability of leaving 
Parliament is positively related with press coverage; the actual amount of money that an MP 
has misappropriated has instead no independent effect. At this stage this relationship cannot 
be interpreted as causal. We will now distinguish between standing down and punishment in 
the ballot box, with the aim to provide causal estimates separately for the two channels. 
 
[ TABLE 1 APPROX. HERE] 
 
3.2 Retirement decisions 
An unprecedented number of MPs either retired or were deselected before the 2010 
general election. Of the 152 MPs who did not run in the 2010 general election, 89 stepped 
down or were deselected in May 2009 or later. In this section we ask if standing down, 
whether due to party pressure or to avoid a likely defeat, has been one of the accountability 
channels that followed the scandal. We estimate the following equation by OLS: 
 
                                                                                    (2)                                                         
 
where      is a dummy equal to one if the MP announces her decision to stand down 
after 8 May 2009. We use the MPs who announced their decision to retire before 8 May 2009, 
i.e. before the scandal erupted, as the control group. Hence, for each specification that uses 
post-scandal retirement decision, we run a placebo regression using pre-scandal retirement 
announcements. 
Column 1 of Table 2 shows that MPs covered more in association with the expenses 
scandal (controlling for pre-scandal coverage and including a battery of individual and 
constituency-level control variables) were more likely to retire.
 18
  In column 2, we perform a 
placebo regression: we repeat the estimation of column 1 but use as dependent variable a 
                                                
18 We have first run simple regressions without control variables and then progressively included our controls. 
The estimated coefficients of interest are remarkably stable across different specifications. We only report here 
our benchmark results, with a full set of control variables. Other estimates are available from the authors. 
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dummy for decisions to stand down announced before the scandal. The coefficient of news-
post is now negative and significant at 10% level. 
 
[ TABLE 2 APPROX. HERE] 
 
Retirement decisions are instead much less robustly associated with the amount of money 
actually misappropriated by MPs, as shown in columns 3 and 4. We again find a positive 
coefficient on post-scandal retirement and a negative one on pre-scandal retirements but these 
coefficients are much smaller and far from acceptable statistical significance. In columns 5 
and 6, we include both news-post and Legg-money: once again what drives retirement is 
media coverage and not the amount of money misappropriated. The placebo regression 
displays no significant coefficients. In other words, reassuringly, there is no impact of post-
scandal news on pre-scandal retirement, which makes it more likely that the positive effect 
found in columns 1 and 5 represent a causal effect of media coverage on the decision to retire. 
The control variables are mostly insignificant but it is worth noting that age has a positive 
impact on pre-scandal retirements but no effect on post-scandal retirement, which provides 
further evidence of the different nature of retirements (on average) in the two periods. 
We then use interaction terms between news-post and individual and constituency-
level variables to explore possible mechanisms for retirement. Table 3 reports the coefficients 
of the interaction terms only (direct effects and other control variables are always included but 
not reported). Results suggest that more rebellious MPs were less likely to step down after the 
scandal in the face of the same amount of newspaper coverage. Our placebo regression 
(column 2) shows that there is no relationship between rebelliousness and pre-scandal 
retirements. This finding suggests that parties were not able to use the scandal as an excuse to 
force less palatable MPs into retirement.
19
 The most noticeable difference between pre and 
post-scandal patterns can be found in gender: female MPs have a higher likelihood to stand 
down when facing news media pressure on the scandal. The placebo regression of column 2 
indicates that no such pattern can be found for pre-scandal retirement.
20
 Other variables, 
including the marginality of a constituency, have generally little or no impact.
21
 
                                                
19 More rebellious MPs are more likely to oppose a party’s request to stand down and it is quite possible that 
MPs who are harder to remove (for example because they are very popular in their electoral constituency) can 
also afford to be more rebellious, indicating reverse causation. 
20 We have also estimated specifications with interactions entered separately rather than jointly. Results are not 
affected, with the exception that the interaction with rebelliousness loses statistical significance. These estimates 
are available from the authors. 
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[ TABLE 3 APPROX. HERE ] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.3. Punishment in the ballot box 
We now want to test whether MPs who were involved in the expenses scandal but 
decided to run saw their vote share decline compared to their 2005 performance. We restrict 
our sample to constituencies where the boundary change was less than 10%, MPs did not 
change party (i.e., MPs who become independent are omitted) and the same individual ran in 
the constituency in both general elections (i.e., the sitting MP was not from a by-election after 
2005). The dependent variable is the difference in vote percentage between the 2005 and 2010 
general elections for an incumbent MP (    : 
 
                                                                                (3)                                                            
 
where, as before, Involvement is captured either by news-post (controlling for news-
pre) or by Legg-money, and X is a vector with the usual covariates. Table 4 shows that news 
coverage had a negative impact on electoral returns. This result is robust across specifications 
in which we incrementally include control variables. Our estimates indicate that a 1% increase 
                                                                                                                                                     
21 The only exception is that Liberal Democrat MPs appear to have been generally less induced to retire from 
scandal news. In specifications with fewer interactions this coefficient is statistically significant at 5% level. This 
can be related to the finding by Eggers (2014) that the punishment of MPs involved in the scandal was heavier in 
constituencies where the two main contenders were Labour and Conservatives. The more “centrist” position of 
Liberal-Democratic MPs may have sheltered them from heavier punishment and the anticipation of more 
leniency by voters may have induced a lower effect of media coverage on the probability of retirement.   
13 
 
in news decreased the electoral return of the incumbent party (compared to its 2005 returns) 
by about 0.007%. Legg-money has instead no effect on   . Column 7 includes both news-
post and Legg-money (with all the controls) and shows the same pattern: no effect of 
misappropriated money and a remarkably stable effect of the amount of news coverage. 
 
[ TABLE 4 APPROX: HERE ] 
 
Table 5 differentiates between seats in which the same individual ran in 2005 and 
2010 and seats where the victorious MP in 2005 had stood down. From columns 1 and 2, it 
emerges that voters’ punishment was personal: in constituencies where the incumbent MP is 
not standing, the vote share of the incumbent party is unaffected by the amount of scandal-
related news coverage. The effect we found in Table 4 appears to be entirely driven by 
constituencies where the incumbent MP is standing again. The result is confirmed by column 
3 where we use an interaction term between news coverage and a dummy for whether the 
incumbent MP is standing. In our benchmark specification with 10% boundary change, a 1% 
increase in news-post (controlling for news-pre) leads to a loss of about 0.008% of the votes 
for incumbent MPs. 
 
[  TABLE 5 APPROX. HERE ] 
 
Models were tested for different thresholds of boundary changes – no change, less than 10% 
change, and less than 25% change. The same pattern emerges independently of our sample 
choice, although magnitudes and statistical significance vary when we use our most restricted 
sample. We repeat the same exercise by using a binary re-election dummy as dependent 
variable. In these regressions news-post never achieves statistical significance showing that, 
in spite of some vote loss, MPs involved in the scandal and standing for re-election did not 
suffer a decreased probability of remaining in parliament.  
Table 6 reports the results of placebo regressions where the dependent variable is the 
vote change between 2001 and 2005. If the scandal caused a decrease in vote share of 
involved MPs, rather than being driven by pre-existing trends, then media coverage of the 
scandal should have no effect on vote change at the previous election, i.e. between 2001 and 
2005. Scandal-related media coverage is never statistically significant across a number of 
specifications. Legg money is associated with an increase in votes between 2001 and 2005 
only in a simple regression with no control variables. Statistical significance vanishes in all 
14 
 
other specifications. These results make it more likely that our previous findings represent 
causal relations. 
We conclude that scandal-related media coverage had a small but statistically 
significant negative impact on vote returns of involved MPs. The amount of money actually 
misappropriated did not. Voters’ punishment was personally directed to involved MPs rather 
than to their party, probably a consequence of the fact that the scandal involved all parties 
more or less equally. In any event, patterns of representation of standing MPs cannot be 
expected to have been substantially altered by the scandal, as shown by the nil effect of re-
election probabilities.  
We also run regressions using turnout rates as dependent variable to see whether 
punishment was driven by abstention rather than voting for a different party. We found no 
significant effect of expenses scandal variables on turnout.
22
  
 
[ TABLE 6 APPROX. HERE ] 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                
22 Results are not reported in the interest of space but are available from the authors. 
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4. Perception, punishment and partisanship 
We now turn to a more detailed analysis of voters’ perceptions regarding their MPs. 
We use individual survey data from the British Election Study 2010 (BES), which contains 
questions regarding the scandal. In particular, the BES dataset contained two questions from 
which we construct a binary and a continuous measure to gauge the perceived level of MP 
malfeasance by individual voters. The binary measure is the individual response to the 
following question (AAQ142):  “Now, thinking about the MP in your local constituency, has 
he or she claimed expense money to which they are not entitled?” [Yes=1, No=0, Don’t 
Know=omitted]. The continuous measure was derived from the following question 
(AAQ143): “On a scale that runs from 0 to 10, where 0 means a very small amount, and 10 
means a very large amount, how much expense money do you think the MP in your local 
constituency has claimed that he or she was not entitled to?”.23 The continuous measure for 
perceived wrongdoing was then calculated as: log(1+AAQ142+AAQ143).  
 
[ TABLE 7 APPROX. HERE ] 
 
4.1 Correlates of voters’ perception of malfeasance 
What determines perceived involvement of an MP in the expenses scandal? In Table 7, 
we report OLS estimates when the dependent variable is the continuous perceived 
involvement variable (similar results can be obtained if we use the binary indicator) and 
explanatory variables consists of respondents’ characteristics and attitudes as well as of 
constituency characteristics. Legg-money and news-post are again the key explanatory 
variables. Column 1 shows that perceived involvement of an MP is positively related to the 
actual amount of money misappropriated. A 1% increase in Legg-money leads to an increase 
of about 0.07% in the perceived involvement of an MP. Perception of involvement is also 
positively related to the amount of media coverage. In column 2, we include constituency 
                                                
23 In both cases “don’t know” respondents were omitted. 
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fixed effects and therefore remove all constituency-specific and MP-specific variables.
24
 This 
helps us focus our attention on the respondents’ characteristics. Respondents that are 
generally more trusting perceive a lower level of involvement in the scandal by their MP as 
compared to respondents who tend to distrust others. Respondents who are more dissatisfied 
with democracy also perceive a higher involvement (the causation is clearly not obvious). 
More educated respondents tend to perceive lower involvement. This effect is particularly 
strong and statistically significant for respondents with a university degree. Other individual 
characteristics do not appear to have statistically significant effects. 
                                                
24 Only constituencies with at least four respondents were included. 
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In column 3, we include the response to the question “most MPs are corrupt” (with the 
possible answers being “agree” or “disagree”) and show that perception of corruption of own 
MP is positively related to perceived corruption of all MPs. Although this is only a correlation, 
it provides evidence of the existence of some form of generalization, whereby a respondent 
perceiving that her MP is corrupt may be led to generalize this perception to all MPs, or 
conversely, a general distrust of MPs may lead to perceive that the local MP is corrupt. These 
results are derived from within constituency variation and cannot therefore depend on the 
identity of the MP, on her behaviour, or on any other event that might have happened at the 
constituency level.  
An important question is whether perception of involvement may have been influenced 
by media exposure. For this purpose, we construct various indicators of exposure to television, 
the press or the internet. Ceteris paribus (in particular, we control for education levels), 
respondents that use the internet to gather political information have generally a more positive 
view of their MP’s involvement in the scandal, while television viewers are more negative 
(column 4).
25
  
In all specifications partisanship appears to be particularly important. The partisan-match 
dummy variable (equal to 1 if the MP belongs to the political party indicated as closest by the 
respondent and zero otherwise) has a strong negative effect on perceived involvement in the 
scandal, even when constituency fixed effects are introduced and therefore perception cannot 
depend on any characteristic of the MP or of the constituency. An important concern is that 
partisanship, which is measured before the 2010 election but after the scandal, could depend 
itself on the perceived involvement of the local MP and therefore be an endogenous regressor. 
To address this concern we use the 2005-2010 BES panel data. In column 5, partisanship is 
measured in 2005, well before the expenses scandal. Despite a much reduced sample size, the 
partisan match coefficient remains statistically significant, negative and its size is actually larger 
than in other columns. In column 5, we include an interaction effect between the partisan match 
dummy and Legg-money. The negative and statistically significant coefficient of the interaction 
term indicates that the elasticity of perceived involvement to actual wrongdoing is much 
                                                
25 However, interaction terms between media exposure and media coverage of the scandal are statistically 
insignificant. Interaction terms between indicators of media exposure and Legg-money are equally insignificant. 
This is true whether we use newspaper readership, television exposure, or internet usage. In other words, the 
responsiveness of perceived involvement to either press coverage of the scandal or money owed does not appear to 
be affected by media exposure. In the interest of space we omit the table with these results. They are available from 
the authors upon request. 
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reduced for co-partisan MPs.
26
 Our results show that perception of wrongdoing is significantly 
affected by partisanship. Further investigation is necessary to understand the reason of this 
partisan bias, which could be due to cognitive dissonance or to media exposure. Our results on 
media coverage of the scandal in Section 5 suggest that the first explanation is more plausible. 
 
4.2 Voting behaviour 
Does perceived involvement in the scandal relate to citizens’ decisions to vote or not for 
an incumbent MP? Whether in the binary or the continuous form, we find that perceived 
malfeasance of an incumbent MP decreased the likelihood of voting for the incumbent party, 
controlling for characteristics of the respondent, of the MP, and of the constituency. The results 
are summarized in Table 8. In this case, the result holds both when we include only 
constituencies with standing MPs and when we include all constituencies (provided the 
boundary change is within the 10% limit). These results are robust across specifications and 
change only marginally if we include constituency fixed effects, therefore focussing on within 
constituency variation in scandal involvement perception. Such variation cannot be due to 
constituency characteristics and therefore can be due neither to MPs actual involvement nor to 
overall media coverage (although individual media exposure may vary). 
 
[ TABLE 8 APPROX. HERE ] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
26 This result holds when we use the 2005-2010 panel, measuring partisanship in 2005, but do not include 
constituency fixed effects. The negative sign of the interaction term remains but its statistical significance drops 
considerably if we include constituency fixed effects in the 2005-2010 panel, which is not surprising given the 
much reduced sample size. 
19 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5. Media coverage of the scandal 
Our results suggest that media coverage of the scandal played a key role in determining 
punishment patterns. In this section we analyse media coverage in more detail, asking in 
particular how it relates to monetary wrongdoing and whether it is possible to detect any 
partisan bias in patterns of coverage. Newspapers in the UK have well-known partisan leanings. 
For example, the Daily Telegraph has endorsed the Conservative Party in every general election 
since 1945, whilst The Independent has endorsed either Labour or a Labour-Liberal Democrat 
pact to prevent the Conservatives from getting into power.
 27
 It is then legitimate to ask whether 
coverage of the scandal has been partisan, i.e. if newspapers traditionally leaning left or right 
have underreported wrongdoings of MPs of the left or right, respectively.
28
 
 
5.1 Aggregate coverage 
A first analysis of overall patterns of coverage is given by equation (4), where the news 
variables refer to the total number of articles in the seven newspapers pulled together:  
 
                                                          (4)     
            
where variable names have the usual interpretations and i indicates MP i. OLS estimates are 
reported in Table 9. We only include party affiliation in column 1, we control for Legg-money 
and personal characteristics in column 2, and we include constituency characteristics in column 
3. Our results show no significant difference in the overall coverage of MPs from different 
                                                
27 Our sample contains right-leaning newspapers (Daily Telegraph, Times, Daily Mail), left-leaning newspapers 
(Guardian, Independent), broadsheet (i.e. quality newspapers: Daily Telegraph, Times, Guardian, Independent, 
Scotsman), and tabloids (entertainment and scandal-oriented newspapers: Sun and Daily Mail). 
28 For a discussion of agenda-setting theories in news-reporting and a description of how these can be scrutinized 
empirically using quantitative information on media coverage, see Larcinese et al. 2011 and Puglisi and Snyder 
2011. For a study of partisan bias in the UK press, see Latham (2015). In particular, Table 7 in Latham (2015) 
provides an estimate of the ideological bias of UK newspapers. 
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parties. Not surprisingly, we find a significantly higher coverage for senior and front-bench MPs 
and a strong positive correlation between coverage and Legg-money. Our result on gender is less 
obvious: we find a significantly higher coverage of female MPs. In column 4, we restrict our 
sample to include only constituencies whose boundaries changed by less than 10%. Our 
conclusions remain unaffected and the magnitude of the female dummy is now substantially 
larger. We have tried to restrict our sample using other thresholds of percentage change in 
constituency boundaries, and again, our conclusions remain unaffected.
29
 
Column 5 shows that coverage of Labour frontbenchers (the Government) was double 
the coverage of Conservative frontbenchers (the official Opposition) and both were significantly 
higher than the coverage of backbenchers. Although constituency marginality does not appear, 
on average, to have had any significant impact on press coverage, column 6 shows that Labour-
held marginal constituencies were significantly less covered than non-marginal constituencies, 
while Conservative and Liberal-democratic marginal constituencies are not statistically 
distinguishable from non-marginals.
30
 
Finally, columns 7 and 8 include interactions between Legg-money and party affiliation. 
The elasticity of coverage to actual money misappropriated turns out to be larger for the Labour 
and (particularly) for the Conservative parties. In this case the coefficient for Conservative MPs 
is both larger and more robust, if we consider estimates restricted to constituencies which 
changed by less than 10%. 
 
[ TABLE 9 APPROX. HERE ] 
 
6.2 An analysis of media bias 
In Table 10, we perform an analysis of individual newspapers’ behaviour focussing on 
possible differences in their coverage patterns.  This means that we now estimate equation (4) 
separately for each newspaper.  
                                                
29 Results are available from the authors. 
30 The same is true of marginal constituencies held by the Scottish National Party and the Party of Wales (Plaid 
Cymru), which are classified as “Other marginal”. These coefficients could clearly just capture some spurious 
correlation but also they cannot rule out the possibility that, although Government members were not spared press 
coverage, the party in government ultimately was. At the same time, if we believe that news coverage captures 
some dimension of malfeasance which is missed by Legg-money, then an alternative interpretation could be that the 
most vulnerable MPs are also those that were more disciplined by re-election perspectives. Since a swing was 
expected against the Labour party, Labour-held marginals were likely to be the most vulnerable seats. 
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We report our results when the seven equations are estimated as a system of seemingly 
unrelated equations (SURE), which provides more efficient estimates than seven separate OLS 
regressions. The coverage of all newspapers is well explained by Legg-money. An increase of 
1% in Legg-money leads to an increased coverage between 0.032% (The Guardian) and 0.056% 
(The Times). We then distinguish between different parties and between back-benchers and 
front-benchers for the two main parties. The omitted group is given by Labour backbenchers. It 
appears that all newspapers gave a much larger coverage of Labour front-benchers compared to 
all other MPs. Conservative front-benchers were also more covered than Labour back-benchers. 
Again, although the magnitudes of coefficients vary across newspapers, they do not follow a 
clear partisan divide. For example, if the Conservative-leaning Daily Mail gives a milder 
coverage of Conservative front-benchers, we also have the Conservative-leaning Times 
providing the strongest coverage. The highest coefficients for coverage of Labour front-
benchers come from the conservative Times, but also from the left-leaning Guardian. 
The other coefficients show no significant differences across newspapers in the coverage 
of MPs from different parties, with the exception of a higher coverage of Liberal Democrats by 
The Guardian and The Daily Mail and a higher coverage of parties other than the main three by 
The Guardian. All newspapers devote more news to coverage of expenses regarding front-
benchers and more senior MPs, and all, except the Scotsman, provide larger coverage of female 
MPs, although the magnitudes are decidedly higher for the Times, the Guardian and the Sun. 
Again, we cannot find a clear pattern for the over-coverage of female MPs, neither according to 
the partisan leaning of newspapers nor according to their broadsheet-tabloid status.  
If an understanding of possible partisan coverage of the scandal can be inferred from the 
significance and magnitude of the party coefficients and our prior knowledge of each 
newspaper’s leaning, another test is offered by the availability of an accurate and independent 
measure of corruption (Legg-money). Using this information our empirical specification 
becomes: 
 
                                                                    (5)                                                                                                      
 
In other words, we ask whether the responsiveness of coverage to actual wrongdoing 
depends on the political affiliation of the MP, and whether different behaviour can be ascribed 
to different newspapers. We find that the interaction effect with Legg-money (    is positive for 
Labour and Conservatives MPs: in other words, responsiveness to money owed was larger for 
the two main parties. We report our estimates of    for Conservative and Labour MPs in Figure 
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2, from which it is clear that    is larger for Conservatives than for Labour MPs (although the 
difference between the two parties is not statistically significant). In this case, it is worth 
highlighting that the two most left-oriented newspapers in our sample (the Guardian and The 
Independent) are those with lowest  ̂  for Labour MPs, while the highest are those of the two 
tabloids, The Sun and the Daily Mail. Once again, however, there are no other discernible 
signals of partisan coverage across newspapers. 
In order to take into account the possibly different levels of coverage of the scandal by 
different newspapers, all our regressions have been repeated using MPs’ coverage share (of 
expenses coverage with respect to total news) rather than number of articles. Results are 
substantively similar to those discussed here and therefore not reported.
31
  
To conclude, we find only limited evidence of partisan coverage of the expenses scandal 
across newspapers. For the seven newspapers examined, a number of patterns were evident, 
controlling for other explanatory variables: ceteris paribus, more senior MPs, front-bench MPs 
from the two main parties and female MPs were mentioned more frequently. The interaction 
effect with Legg-money (    is positive for Labour and Conservatives MPs and leads us to 
uncover a possible under-coverage of Labour MPs by The Guardian and The Independent. In 
general, however, the patterns we found hold equally for all newspapers with little variation. 
Given the substantially higher coverage of front-benchers belonging to Labour (the party in 
government) and, in second place, of the frontbenchers of the main opposition party (potential 
government members), we can conclude that the role of the press was mostly that of a watchdog 
placing under closer scrutiny the government and its potential replacement. 
 
[ FIGURE 2 APPROX. HERE ] 
 
[ TABLE 10 APPROX. HERE ] 
 
 
 
  
                                                
31 They are available from the authors upon request. 
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6. Quantifying the effects: an overall assessment 
The path from corruption to voter punishment is complex. It is useful, therefore, to 
synthetize our many regressions in a few key quantities of interest. Figure 3 quantifies the 
key links in our accountability framework, by choosing in each case our benchmark 
estimates. We report for each channel the impact of one standard deviation increase from the 
mean.
32
 Using the Legg report as a benchmark of malfeasance, we estimate that an increase 
of one standard deviation above the mean in irregularly claimed expenses leads to a 7.3% 
increase in reported news. In turn, a one standard deviation increase in press coverage leads 
to 5.8% higher probability to step down and to a fall of 0.92% in the votes of standing MPs. 
Combining the effect of expenses on press coverage and the effect of coverage on the 
electoral outcomes, we have that one standard deviation increase in irregularly claimed 
expenses leads to a 0.2% higher probability of resignation and to a 0.003% loss in votes.  
Any effect is entirely channelled through news-reporting, as there is no independent effect of 
Legg-money either on the probability to step down or on the vote share of standing MPs. 
Finally, any change that may have occurred in the vote share of MPs involved in the scandal 
                                                
32 In the regressions we use a logarithmic transformation for our key variables, hence our regression tables report 
local effects (marginal effects or elasticities, depending on whether the left-hand variable is also expressed in logs 
or not). To calculate the impact of a standard deviation from the mean for each the explanatory variable we proceed 
as follows. First, we calculate the percentage increase corresponding to changing the explanatory variable up from 
the mean by one standard deviation. If we call this percentage p then, in the linear-log models, the impact of a p% 
increase in the explanatory variable above the mean on the dependent variable can be calculated as  ̂    
     
   
 . 
This is applied to our estimates in Tables 2, 5, and 8. For our results in Table 7 and 9, which use a log-log 
specification, the effect is calculated as   ̂  where c=log[(100+p)/100].     
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and standing for re-election has led to no change in their probability to be re-elected, which 
is not surprising given the small magnitudes of the vote losses. 
Voters’ perception of wrongdoing is influenced by increased misappropriated money 
both via press coverage (+23% per standard deviation increase in coverage) and via other 
means (+9.2% per standard deviation increase in misappropriated money). Partisan leaning 
also has a substantial independent effect on the perceived wrongdoing of an MP (+27% per 
one standard deviation above the mean). One standard deviation increase above the mean in 
the perceived involvement of an MP would in turn decrease the probability of voting for 
him/her by 3.6%. Hence one standard deviation increase above the mean in misappropriated 
money made voters 1.16% less likely to vote for a standing MP (0.322×0.036). It is also 
worth noting that by combining the effect of the press on perceived involvement (+23%) 
with the effect of such perception on the probability of voting for an incumbent MP (-3.6%) 
we obtain an overall effect of an increase of one standard deviation from the mean in press 
coverage on the individual probability of voting for an incumbent MP (-0.83%) which is not 
too far for the (reduced form) impact of the press on aggregate vote shares (-0.92%, derived 
with constituency level data), showing that these independently estimated effects are 
consistent with each other. 
If we consider how many factors can influence voting, the small effects that we 
estimate are not negligible. At the same time, punishment was not overwhelming and did not 
affect the probability of a standing MP to be re-elected. If the final aim of the process is “to 
remove the rascals”, then retirement of the most involved MPs has been in this case the only 
mechanism which has actually led to a statistically significant change in the identity of 
elected representatives. This fact does not reduce the importance of elections in any way, 
since standing down (or de-selection by local political party organisation) is likely to be 
driven by fear of punishment in the ballot box. 
 
[ FIGURE 3 APPROX. HERE ] 
 
7. Discussion 
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Our evidence provides support for theories that stress the importance of information 
availability for a well-functioning democracy.
33
 The disclosure of information on MPs’ detailed 
expenses items led to a wave of resignations and eventually to voters’ punishment of the most 
involved MPs. Crucially, we find that, while information available on the press matters for 
resignations and electoral returns, an objective monetary measure of wrongdoing does not have 
any independent effect. Our findings point to the importance of mass media as watchdogs of 
power and also adds to a burgeoning literature on media bias and media effects which has been 
so far mostly focussed on the US press.
34
 We provide a rather benign assessment of the British 
press, whose coverage of the scandal appears to have been positively linked to monetary 
wrongdoing, and mostly focussed on government members.
35
 This seems to corroborate other 
studies which found that media played an important role during the UK expenses scandal and 
that coverage focussed on high-profile MPs suspected of malfeasance (Graffin et al. 2013). 
The question of whether voters punish corrupt politicians has been addressed by 
numerous previous works.
36
 The most compelling evidence in this sense has been provided in a 
paper by Ferraz and Finan (2008), which exploits random audits of Brazilian municipalities 
carried out as a part of an anticorruption program. They find that corruption discovery 
substantially reduces mayors’ probability of re-election and that this effect is enhanced by the 
presence of local radio stations. Our findings on mass media are mostly consistent with those of 
Ferraz and Finan (2008). Differently from them, however, we do not find an effect on the re-
election probabilities of standing MPs.
37
 This is in line with most existing evidence, showing 
that the electoral punishment is often small and insufficient to prevent the re-election of 
                                                
33 See for example Ferejohn (1986) and Besley and Prat (2006). For an overview of these theories, see Persson and 
Tabellini (2000). A fast expanding empirical literature has recently added increasingly reliable evidence of the 
importance of information for accountability purposes. See for example Besley and Burgess (2002), Besley, Pande 
and Rao (2005), Chang, Golden and Hill (2010), and Ferraz and Finan (2008).  
34 See Larcinese et al. (2011) and the references therein. Studies on non-US contexts have also highlighted the 
important monitoring role of media to help citizens ‘disentangle’ cases of real versus unfounded corruption, such as 
Spain (e.g., Costas-Pérez et al. 2012). 
35 Puglisi and Snyder (2011) find instead that the coverage of scandals by the US press follows their partisan 
leaning (as measured by their electoral endorsements). For more evidence on the US press see also Puglisi and 
Snyder (2015) and the references therein. 
36 See for example Peters and Welch 1980, Jacobson and Dimock 1994 and Hirano and Snyder (2012) for studies of 
the US Congress. 
37 This is unlikely to be due to institutional differences, since the electoral system in the two cases are quite similar 
and broadly comparable:  Brazilian mayors are elected by simple plurality in cities with less than half million 
inhabitants.  
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incumbent corrupt politicians.
38
 Our analysis shows that partisanship can substantially affect 
perceptions of corruption and it may be reasonable to assume that partisanship matters most in 
national elections (where for example most decisions on taxation, public spending and 
redistribution are taken), while instead the valence of candidates can have a relatively higher 
impact in local elections, which is the setting of the investigation of Ferraz and Finan (2008).  
Before us, evidence that partisanship matters for perceived corruption has been provided 
by Anduiza et al. (2013) for Spain. In their experimental paper, respondents face a simulated 
newspaper article after declaring which party they feel closer to. Our paper is the first to provide 
evidence of a partisan effect on perceived corruption by using observational data.  
The importance of partisanship for accountability has also been stressed in Eggers 
(2014), also based on the British expenses scandal. With reference to England only, Eggers 
(2014) shows that in Labour-Conservative battlegrounds, where the partisan stakes were 
presumably higher, implicated MPs were less severely punished.
39
 Compared with Eggers 
(2014) we provide evidence that the impact of partisanship on accountability does not only 
concern voting choices (for a given perception of corruption) where voters choose whether or 
not to remove a corrupt politician by trading off ideology with valence. Our results go one step 
further by showing that pre-existing partisanship may even affect the perceptions held by voters 
about the honesty of their MPs: in other words, cognitive dissonance may remove the trade-off 
between ideology and valence in the voters’ mind.  Our conclusion, pointing at the complexity 
of the role played by prior beliefs (partisanship) in the voters’ mind, is that biased perceptions 
and sticky beliefs can represent formidable obstacles to accountability.
40
  
                                                
38 See for example Fernandez-Vazquez et al. (2015) and Riera et al. (2013) for Spain, and the survey in Golden 
(2006). A small electoral effect has also been found in other studies of the UK expenses scandal (see Eggers and 
Fisher 2011, Johnston and Pattie 2012, Vivyan et. al. 2012, and Wagner et al. 2014), although none of these studies 
addresses identification concerns.  
39 Although our paper and Eggers (2014) reach similar conclusions for what concerns the impact of partisanship on 
accountability, they differ on a number of dimensions. In particular, Eggers (2014) is exclusively focussed on the 
role of partisanship and represents the most accurate study on that issue. The scope of our paper is broader and we 
provide evidence on the whole accountability process (with a special focus on information), with partisanship 
representing only one of the variables of interest.  
40 Our evidence is difficult to entirely reconcile with spatial models of elections populated by rational voters and is 
more consistent with theories of cognitive dissonance, i.e. the idea that beliefs may be changed to achieve greater 
internal consistency (Festinger 1957). Other evidence of instances of voters’ cognitive dissonance is provided in 
Beasley and Joslyn (2001) and Mullainathan and Washington (2009). Particularly relevant is the study of Dimock 
and Jacobson (1995), which studies the aforementioned US House banking scandal and reaches conclusions similar 
to ours. 
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Two other factors contributed to an overall small electoral punishment: 1) the most 
involved MPs decided not to run;  2) punishment was “personal” rather than partisan, hence new 
candidates replacing MPs implicated in the scandal were not punished. This means that the 
selection effect of elections cannot simply be captured by looking at election results or voting 
behaviour since politicians may anticipate negative electoral outcomes and decide to stand 
down. Our conclusion is that elections do keep public officials accountable, at least in the case 
we study, but that the effect is mostly displayed at the candidacy stage. This echoes the findings 
of Hirano and Snyder (2012), who, for the US Congress, find that most of the punishment for 
corrupt incumbents happens in primary elections. The mechanism is clearly different from that 
operating in the UK, where deselection is determined only by party members and usually 
induced by party leaders, but highlights again the fact that looking at electoral punishment in 
general elections could substantially underestimate the capability of democratic systems to 
“throw out the rascals”. Our analysis, together with the evidence from US primaries, points to 
the importance of pre-electoral accountability. Although most efforts have been devoted to 
studying the role of elections (and particularly electoral competition) for democratic 
accountability, the processes that lead to candidate selection have been comparatively 
understudied, with the exception of the US primaries, which are also elections. Candidate 
selection in the US is highly decentralised, with parties having less influence than voters in the 
primary-based system (Ware 1996). Candidate selection amongst major UK parties, by contrast, 
combines quite centralised political parties with decentralized selection of candidates by local 
branches of political parties (Denver 1988). The general trend in reforms in candidate selection 
in the UK has both centralized more power with the national parties and yet given more voice to 
voters and local supporters (Webb 1994), though party leaders ultimately remain more powerful 
(Hopkin 2001). However, the election of Jeremy Corbyn as leader of the UK Labour Party in 
2015 and in 2016, with widespread support amongst members and low support amongst the 
National Executive Committee and Parliamentary Labour Party, perhaps indicates that the 
pendulum has swung in the other direction in the party. There are also cross-country 
comparisons of candidate selection (Gallagher and Marsh 1988), with more recent scholarship 
attempting to distil factors that determine the features of candidate selection more generally 
(Hazan and Rahat 2010). It is evident from our conclusion the need for a better understanding of 
the internal organization of political parties. From a practical point of view, improving the 
internal democracy of parties is probably as important for democratic accountability as having 
competitive elections. And precisely like in the case of US primaries, it might be important to 
regulate party organizations so that they can efficiently perform their important selection role.      
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There are two other contributions emerging from our paper deserving separate 
discussions. First, the results indicate a significant gendered effect: we provide robust evidence 
that female MPs were subject to higher scandal-related coverage in the press, had a higher 
probability to stand down as a reaction to press coverage, and suffered higher loss of votes in 
2010 compared to 2005. At this stage we can only speculate on the underlying reasons for these 
findings. There is an extensive literature on the difference of the volume (Kahn 1994a, 1994b; 
Jalazai 2006) and tone (Romaine 1999; Murray 2010) of media coverage of female politicians 
compared to male politicians which is consistent with our findings on press coverage. Core 
attitudes about gender and morality can in turn both influence and be influenced by the media. 
An extensive literature analyses the different public expectations on ruthless, ambitious males 
contrasted with stereotypical “ethical” or “nurturing” females (Gilligan 1982; Ones and 
Viswesvaran 1998; Eagly and Crowley 1986; Piliavin and Unger 1985; Hoffman 1977; Johnson 
and Aries 1983). This contrast may have led to greater punishment of female MPs compared to 
their male counterparts.
41
 A recent large-scale survey after the expenses scandal concluded that 
female British MPs in particular felt that their family lives were strained (Byrne and Theakston 
2015). Our findings can also be related to the work of Gagliarducci and Paserman (2012), who 
find that the probability of early termination of Italian city councils is higher when the mayor is 
a female and that this gender effect increases in male-dominated legislatures, highlighting the 
hurdles faced by female politicians in a male-dominated environment.
42
 A number of papers 
(not related to politics and election) also tend to show that females are on average less inclined 
to engage and perform well in more competitive situations (Gneezy et al 2003, Niederle and 
Versterlund 2007, Dohmen and Falck 2011), which could explain our findings that female MPs 
involved in the scandal were, ceteris paribus, more likely to retire.    
Finally, although we have tried to highlight the general relevance of our findings for the 
literature on democratic accountability, our analysis is also related to the political science 
literature on the British political system.  In particular we provide evidence of a “personal vote” 
(Cain et al. 1990), whereby MPs that have been deemed to have exploited the expenses system 
are punished if they stand for office in the 2010 general election, but there is no significant 
electoral punishment for a disgraced MP’s political party if she/he stands down or resigns. This 
suggests that, even in the British system, where voting behaviour has mostly been associated 
                                                
41 Some scholars have concluded that an increase in accountability can be fostered through greater female political 
participation (Dollar et al. 2001; Swamy et al. 2001), although this relationship may be spurious (Sung 2002). 
42 In subsequent work, Gagliarducci and Paserman (2014) stress females’ higher propensity to cooperate in 
legislatures. 
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with partisanship and social class,
43
 the personal identity of candidates matter. However, as 
mentioned above, partisanship still mediates perceptions of wrongdoing, so that voter political 
party affinities affect the likelihood of sanctioning an incumbent MP for her/his behaviour. 
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A1: The MPs’ Expenses Scandal: background information 
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A1.1 Brief description of the MPs Expenses Allowance system 
The annual salary of an MP at the time the scandal erupted was £64,766.
44
 In addition to 
annual salaries, Members are also able to claim expenses in a number of different ways.  
Members from constituencies outside London would be able to claim the Additional Costs 
Allowance (ACA), which would be compensation for staying away from their primary residence 
to conduct business related to their Parliamentary duties. The ACA was £24,006 at the time of 
the scandal.
45
 The Incidental Expenses Provision (IEP) could be used to meet the costs related to 
running offices or surgeries, including: accommodation; equipment; and communications. The 
IEP was £22,193. Members received a separate Staffing Allowance of £90,854. The IEP can 
also be used to offset certain costs related to staffing, and 10% of the Staffing Allowance can be 
channelled into the IEP if Members run a constituency office. Members received a 
Communications Allowance of £10,400 that could draw funds from the ACA, but not vice 
versa. MPs also received a number of benefits through travel allowances.
46
 
 
A1.2 Background information on the expenses scandal 
The publication of detailed MP expenses and the public scandal that followed represents 
the culmination of a political process that was driven by two predominant factors: the slow 
implementation and political resistance to the Freedom of Information Act (2000) [FOIA]; and 
the non-transparent allowances system that relied on Members of Parliament to regulate their 
own claims. 
The Parliament ratified FOIA in November 2000, with provisions of the legislation 
gradually coming into force, with full implementation on 1 January 2005. It contained far-
reaching measures for freedom of information legislation that would apply to all public bodies, 
                                                
44 ‘Members’ pay, pensions and allowances’ (Factsheet M5, revised), House of Commons Information Office, July 
2011.  
45 Members from Inner London constituencies were eligible for a London Supplement, instead of the ACA. The 
Supplement was paid with the MP monthly salary, and was subject to tax and National Insurance, and could not be 
used to contribute to the Member’s pension. Outer London MPs could choose to either claim an ACA or London 
Supplement. The London Supplement was £2,916. 
46Rail and air travel between Westminster and the constituency for Parliamentary business would be paid, as well as 
claims for mileage. There was a similar category for travel allowances to places in the UK on Parliamentary 
business that were outside the constituency. Furthermore, MPs received travel and subsistence costs for up to three 
visits per year to EU institutions, EU agencies, the national parliaments of EU member states, European Free Trade 
Association states, or candidate countries. Immediate family members of the MP and MP staff were also covered by 
the travel allowances. 
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not only covering the two Houses of Parliament and devolved governmental bodies in Scotland 
and Wales, but also local authorities, the NHS, Armed Forces, education institutions, public 
broadcasters, and quasi-NGOs.
47
 
In a test of the newly-implemented FOIA, some journalists made a number of requests to 
Parliament to disclose Member expense claims, but these requests were rejected. After an 
appeal, the Information Commissioner ordered the House of Commons to provide detailed ACA 
claims with receipt. Despite the ruling, MPs continued attempts to block detailed disclosure of 
MP expenses. Speaker Michael Martin (whose expenses were under scrutiny) and a number of 
senior MPs appealed to the High Court in May 2008 to overturn the Information 
Commissioner’s decision, but the Court ruled against the House of Commons appeal. The 
Government finally proposed a statement on reforming MP expenses claims, including the full 
disclosure of receipts from 1 July 2009. However, The Daily Telegraph published detailed 
expenses leaked to the newspaper by a “mole” in Whitehall who was working for a contractor. 
According to the Assistant Editor of The Daily Telegraph, the insider had been given a one-off 
payment of £110,000 for the data, which the newspaper felt was worthwhile on public interest 
grounds (Winnett and Rayner 2009). The House of Commons appealed to the Metropolitan 
Police to start a criminal investigation about the leak, but the police refused to do so, since it 
would not serve the public interest. 
The details of MP expenses shocked and angered the public, and forced leaders from all 
three major political parties to react immediately. Some of the claims became symbolic of 
political corruption and greed
48
. To restore confidence in MPs and the system of expenses, Sir 
Thomas Legg was commissioned to audit all MP expenses made under the ACA between 2004 
and 2008. During the review, Sir Legg contacted certain MPs to request to justify the claims and 
asked some for repayment. The report into the ACA claims 2004-2008 was published in 
February 2010. 
The detailed expenses claims published by The Telegraph also illustrated systematic 
exploitation of the allowances system that carried on without transparency and oversight. There 
were a number of “tricks of the trade” that MPs used to maximise the benefits of their 
allowances (see Rayner 2009). Some of the MP activities were examined more closely as 
                                                
47 The White Paper was written before the establishment of the Northern Ireland Assembly and Executive. 
48Among these “Douglas Hogg included with his expenses claims the cost of having the moat cleared, piano tuned 
and stable lights fixed at his country manor house.”; and “Sir Peter Viggers included with his expense claims the 
£1,645 cost of a floating duck house in the garden pond at his Hampshire home”. 
 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/mps-expenses/5297606/MPs-expenses-Full-list-of-MPs-investigated-
by-the-Telegraph.html 
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potential criminal cases. There were six Members of Parliament who were under police 
investigation before the 2010 general election: Lord Taylor and Lord Hanningfield from the 
House of Lords; and David Chaytor, Jim Devine, Eric Illsley, and Elliot Morley from the House 
of Commons. All six were eventually found guilty of charges related to expenses and sent to 
prison.  
 
 
 
Figure 1. The democratic accountability process 
 
 
Figure 2: 3ˆ   for Conservative (grey) and Labour (black) MPs. The lines are 5% confidence 
intervals. 
 
Figure 3: Key channels in the accountability process: quantifying the effects on observables. 
Note: Squares and normal arrows refer to MP-level variables, circles and bold arrows  to individual  level variables 
(from BES). Numbers reported are approximations  to the second decimal from our favourite specifications.  A one 
standard deviation change refers to a change in the explanatory variable, the effect on dependent variables is 
expressed in percentages and reported next to arrows.  For log-linear regressions we use the approximation 
       . 
 
 
Table 1. Probability of leaving parliament 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dep. Variable MP left parliament 
       news-post 0.0451*** 
 
0.0441** 0.0307* 
 
0.0328** 
 
(0.017) 
 
(0.017) (0.016) 
 
(0.016) 
news-pre 
-
0.0541*** 
 
-
0.0538*** -0.0244 
 
-0.0246* 
 
(0.016) 
 
(0.016) (0.015) 
 
(0.015) 
Legg-money 
 
0.0035 0.0016 
 
-0.0034 -0.0045 
  
(0.005) (0.005) 
 
(0.005) (0.005) 
conservative 
   
-
0.2147*** 
-
0.2087*** 
-
0.2108*** 
    
(0.049) (0.050) (0.050) 
libdem 
   
-0.1219* -0.1288* -0.1254* 
    
(0.070) (0.070) (0.070) 
other 
   
0.1596 0.1594 0.1607 
    
(0.133) (0.133) (0.131) 
age 
   
0.0064** 0.0069** 0.0065** 
    
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
seniority 
   
0.0036 0.0042 0.0035 
    
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Δfrontbench 
   
-0.0565 -0.0659 -0.0569 
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(0.047) (0.046) (0.047) 
frontbench 
   
-0.0743 -0.0673 -0.0724 
    
(0.061) (0.057) (0.061) 
incumbent in 2005 
  
0.1887*** 0.1866*** 0.1945*** 
    
(0.051) (0.051) (0.051) 
degree 
   
-0.0557 -0.0513 -0.0561 
    
(0.049) (0.049) (0.049) 
oxbridge educated 
  
0.0858** 0.0797* 0.0857** 
    
(0.043) (0.043) (0.044) 
female 
   
0.1258*** 0.1421*** 0.1275*** 
    
(0.047) (0.047) (0.047) 
marginality 2005 
   
0.2952*** 0.2935*** 0.2969*** 
    
(0.042) (0.043) (0.042) 
Constant 0.3516*** 0.3172*** 0.3473*** -0.2091 -0.2198 -0.2080 
 
(0.039) (0.027) (0.042) (0.170) (0.165) (0.170) 
              
Observations 588 588 588 588 588 588 
R-squared 0.0214 0.0008 0.0215 0.2433 0.2384 0.2444 
 
Note: columns 4-5-6 also include dummy variables for UK regional standard regions.  
Estimation by OLS. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 2. Scandal involvement and standing down 
Dep. variable: standing 
down dummy (pre or post 
scandal) 
post pre post pre post pre 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
news-post 0.0502*** -0.0216* 
  
0.0499*** -0.0193 
 
(0.018) (0.013) 
  
(0.018) (0.013) 
news-pre -0.0131 0.0042 
  
-0.0130 0.0037 
 
(0.016) (0.011) 
  
(0.016) (0.011) 
Legg-money 
  
0.0032 -0.0045 0.0004 -0.0034 
   
(0.006) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) 
conservative -0.1078** -0.0380 
-
0.1125** -0.0319 -0.1083** -0.0335 
 
(0.051) (0.040) (0.052) (0.039) (0.052) (0.040) 
libdem -0.0856 
-
0.0548** -0.0905* -0.0552** -0.0853 -0.0575** 
 
(0.055) (0.027) (0.054) (0.028) (0.055) (0.027) 
other 0.0899 0.0052 0.1092 -0.0027 0.0899 0.0051 
 
(0.130) (0.085) (0.132) (0.083) (0.130) (0.084) 
age 0.0012 0.0049** 0.0009 0.0052** 0.0011 0.0050** 
 
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
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seniority 0.0041 0.0049 0.0060* 0.0039 0.0041 0.0047 
 
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) 
Δfront (el2010-el2005) -0.0122 -0.0149 -0.0403 -0.0029 -0.0122 -0.0146 
 
(0.055) (0.031) (0.054) (0.030) (0.055) (0.031) 
frontbench -0.0289 -0.0165 0.0289 -0.0405 -0.0291 -0.0154 
 
(0.073) (0.038) (0.068) (0.028) (0.073) (0.038) 
incumbent in 2005 0.0280 -0.0253 0.0169 -0.0160 0.0274 -0.0199 
 
(0.050) (0.036) (0.051) (0.035) (0.051) (0.035) 
degree -0.0168 -0.0226 -0.0063 -0.0282 -0.0166 -0.0245 
 
(0.051) (0.040) (0.050) (0.040) (0.051) (0.040) 
oxbridge educated 0.0478 0.0237 0.0518 0.0212 0.0479 0.0231 
 
(0.044) (0.034) (0.044) (0.033) (0.044) (0.034) 
female 0.0333 0.0366 0.0581 0.0271 0.0333 0.0364 
 
(0.051) (0.040) (0.055) (0.040) (0.051) (0.040) 
marginality 2005 0.0041 -0.0145 -0.0062 -0.0076 0.0038 -0.0115 
 
(0.044) (0.031) (0.043) (0.031) (0.043) (0.031) 
Constant -0.0465 
-
0.2642** 0.0067 
-
0.2926*** -0.0461 -0.2672** 
  (0.184) (0.111) (0.177) (0.110) (0.185) (0.110) 
Observations 359 359 359 359 359 359 
R-squared 0.1239 0.1537 0.1029 0.1500 0.1240 0.1557 
 
 
 
Table 3. Scandal involvement and standing down (interactions with news-post) 
Dep. variable: standing down dummy (pre 
or post scandal) post pre 
 
(1) (2) 
rebellions -0.0441* 0.0111 
 
(0.025) (0.017) 
absences -0.0041 0.0040 
 
(0.004) (0.003) 
marginality -0.0185 0.0391 
 
(0.039) (0.029) 
conservative -0.0566 0.1397 
 
(0.133) (0.086) 
labour -0.0971 0.1375 
 
(0.139) (0.084) 
libdem -0.1568 0.1049 
 
(0.124) (0.082) 
front-bench -0.0202 -0.0280 
 
(0.048) (0.025) 
age 0.0026 -0.0046** 
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(0.003) (0.002) 
female 0.1795*** -0.0034 
 
(0.041) (0.034) 
seniority 0.0017 0.0028 
 
(0.004) (0.003) 
oxgridge educated -0.0276 0.0193 
 
(0.040) (0.027) 
Observations 359 359 
R-squared 0.2283 0.2290 
All the variables included in Table 2 have been included in all regressions. Columns 1 and 2 also include 
the main effect of rebellion and absences. Each coefficient refers to the interaction term between the 
variable in question and news-post. The dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 if the MP 
announced decision to stand down at the next election. In the -pre- columns the announcement was 
made before May 8, 2009, in the -post- columns the announcement was made after May 8, 2009. 
Region dummies are included (referred to the 11 standard UK regions). Robust standard errors in 
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Table 4. 2010-2005 difference in vote percentage for incumbent party 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Dep. Variable Δvote Δvote Δvote Δvote Δvote Δvote Δvote 
        
news-post -0.9159** 
 
-
0.7119**
* 
 
-0.6445** 
 
-0.6458** 
 
(0.358) 
 
(0.263) 
 
(0.256) 
 
(0.262) 
news-pre 
0.8556**
* 
 
0.3152 
 
0.3256 
 
0.3258 
 
(0.313) 
 
(0.246) 
 
(0.260) 
 
(0.259) 
Legg-money 
 
-0.0623 
 
-0.0578 
 
-0.0312 0.0020 
  
(0.103) 
 
(0.075) 
 
(0.074) (0.075) 
conservative 
  
9.9324**
* 
10.0204**
* 
9.4089**
* 
9.4717**
* 
9.4062**
* 
   
(0.699) (0.689) (0.796) (0.799) (0.800) 
libdem 
  
3.2794** 3.2967** 2.5812* 2.6288* 2.5827* 
   
(1.374) (1.419) (1.375) (1.396) (1.380) 
other 
  
1.3316 1.1926 0.9708 0.7909 0.9711 
   
(2.257) (2.231) (2.314) (2.254) (2.317) 
age 
    
0.0597 0.0565 0.0596 
     
(0.040) (0.040) (0.040) 
seniority 
    
-0.0155 -0.0342 -0.0154 
     
(0.049) (0.049) (0.049) 
Δfront (el2010-el2005) 
   
0.2380 0.5132 0.2377 
     
(0.765) (0.774) (0.768) 
frontbench 
    
0.7731 0.3202 0.7726 
     
(1.221) (1.066) (1.218) 
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incumbent in 2005 
    
-
2.9338**
* 
-
2.7665**
* 
-
2.9370**
* 
     
(0.811) (0.837) (0.835) 
degree 
    
0.7731 0.6132 0.7742 
     
(0.716) (0.707) (0.717) 
oxbridge educated 
    
-0.1394 -0.1429 -0.1390 
     
(0.694) (0.692) (0.694) 
female 
    
-1.0845* -1.4424** -1.0843* 
     
(0.627) (0.639) (0.628) 
marginality 2005 
    
0.4715 0.5998 0.4697 
     
(0.655) (0.666) (0.660) 
Constant -1.6610** 
-
1.4904**
* 
-
6.0227**
* -6.7644*** 
-
7.3164**
* 
-
7.4377**
* 
-
7.3146**
* 
  (0.773) (0.539) (1.163) (1.101) (2.406) (2.325) (2.406) 
Region dummies no no yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations 356 356 356 356 356 356 356 
R-squared 0.0273 0.0010 0.5342 0.5235 0.5594 0.5515 0.5594 
 
Note: region dummies are the 11 UK standard regions. Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 5. The personal punishment: sitting MPs vs open seats 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Dep. 
Variable Δvote Δvote Δvote 
Δvot
e Δvote 
re-
electio
n 
probabi
lity 
re-
electio
n 
probabi
lity 
re-
electio
n 
probabi
lity 
re-
electio
n 
probabi
lity 
re-
electio
n 
probabi
lity 
news-post 
0.049
1 
-
0.7867
** 0.3823 
-
0.58
59 0.3857 0.0396 -0.0083 0.0476 -0.0233 0.0416 
 (0.515
) 
(0.314) (0.433) (1.17
7) 
(0.319) (0.053) (0.018) (0.038) (0.077) (0.030) 
news-pre 
-
1.056
0* 
0.6887
** 
-
0.9780
* 
-
0.14
14 
-
0.7803* -0.0487 0.0102 -0.0198 0.0070 -0.0043 
 (0.604
) 
(0.298) (0.538) (1.17
5) 
(0.450) (0.032) (0.014) (0.032) (0.047) (0.027) 
sitting MP 
  
1.6146 
-
0.12
82 
2.3650*
* 
  
0.1390 0.1143 
0.1839
** 
 (1.349) (3.46
8) 
(1.085) (0.089) (0.105) (0.083) 
sitting MP x 
news-post 
  
-
1.2679
** 
-
0.32
55 
-
1.4038*
** 
  
-0.0614 0.0015 -0.0504 
 (0.541) (1.26
2) 
(0.443) (0.040) (0.082) (0.034) 
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sitting MP x 
news-pre 
  
1.6377
*** 
0.41
19 
1.4754*
** 
  
0.0293 -0.0352 0.0124 
     (0.608) (1.26
6) 
(0.517)     (0.034) (0.052) (0.030) 
Control 
variables 
All controls, regional dumimies and a constant are included 
Sample 
open 
seats 
sitting 
mp 
all all all 
open 
seats 
sitting 
mp 
all all all 
max % 
boundary 
change 
10 10 10 0 25 10 10 10 0 25 
Observation
s 75 281 356 121 458 75 284 359 122 461 
R-squared 
0.750
3 0.5682 0.5866 
0.57
21 0.5779 0.6231 0.4916 0.4909 0.6207 0.4207 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 6: Voting returns: placebo regressions 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dep. Variable 
Δvote 
(2001-05) 
Δvote 
(2001-05) 
Δvote 
(2001-05) 
Δvote (2001-
05) 
Δvote (2001-
05) 
Δvote (2001-
05) 
       news-post 0.1325 0.0326 0.0112 0.0726 0.0626 0.1471 
 
(0.259) (0.261) (0.194) (0.243) (0.518) (0.205) 
news-pre 0.4379* 0.4766* 0.1273 0.0436 -0.0678 0.0402 
 
(0.250) (0.249) (0.178) (0.199) (0.387) (0.168) 
Legg-money 
 
0.1453* 0.0128 0.0260 0.0098 0.0553 
  
(0.085) (0.062) (0.075) (0.160) (0.065) 
Constant 
-
4.6912*** 
-
5.0798*** 
-
9.7208*** 
-
10.4112*** 
-
14.0841*** -9.0576*** 
 
(0.594) (0.635) (2.300) (2.616) (5.216) (2.169) 
       Control variables no no yes yes yes yes 
Sample all all all 
sitting mps 
2010 
sitting mps 
2010 
sitting mps 
2010 
Max boundary 
change (%) 10 10 10 10 0 25 
       Observations 352 352 352 277 98 349 
R-squared 0.0172 0.0249 0.5400 0.5322 0.6022 0.5405 
Note: control variables are those included in column 7 of Table 9. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 7. Correlates of involvement perception (British Election Study) 
Dep. Variable perceived involvement 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Legg-money 0.0648*** 
     
 
(0.0043) 
     news-post 0.1771*** 
     
 
(0.0143) 
     
news-pre 
-
0.0630*** 
     
 
(0.0134) 
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partisan match 
-
0.1873*** 
-
0.1773*** 
-
0.1710*** 
-
0.1805*** -0.2705** -0.1251** 
 
(0.0495) (0.0440) (0.0434) (0.0436) (0.1098) (0.0495) 
Most MPs corrupt 
  
0.1485*** 0.1454*** 0.0687* 0.1449*** 
   
(0.0129) (0.0131) (0.038) (0.013) 
press usage 
   
0.0151 -0.0164 0.0154 
    
(0.0107) (0.0267) (0.0106) 
television usage 
   
0.0261** 0.0343 0.0253* 
    
(0.0131) (0.0305) (0.0131) 
internet usage 
   
-0.0535** -0.0246 
-
0.0563*** 
    
(0.0211) (0.0562) (0.0212) 
partisan match x Legg-money 
     
-0.0172** 
      
(0.0074) 
voted for the MP in 2005 
-
0.1498*** 
-
0.1122*** 
-
0.1107*** 
-
0.1036*** -0.113 
-
0.1005*** 
 
(0.0446) (0.0397) (0.0392) (0.0392) (0.1016) (0.0391) 
trust others 
-
0.0261*** 
-
0.0215*** -0.0056 -0.0056 0.0113 -0.0047 
 
(0.0073) (0.0071) (0.0071) (0.0071) (0.0206) (0.0071) 
attention to politics -0.0013 0.0008 0.0122 0.0105 0.0215 0.0108 
 
(0.0076) (0.0079) (0.0078) (0.0085) (0.0222) (0.0085) 
fairly satisfied with democracy -0.0137 0.0764 0.0511 0.0495 0.1753 0.0483 
 
(0.0652) (0.0598) (0.0606) (0.0606) (0.1963) (0.0603) 
a little dissatisfied with democracy 0.1106 0.1699*** 0.1178* 0.1184* 0.2094 0.1117* 
 
(0.0675) (0.0617) (0.0612) (0.0613) (0.2016) (0.0613) 
very dissatisfied with democracy 0.1526** 0.2408*** 0.1344* 0.1415** 0.335 0.1425** 
 
(0.0735) (0.0680) (0.0693) (0.0696) (0.2161) (0.0694) 
finished full time education 16 0.0318 -0.0674 -0.0402 -0.0333 -0.1021 -0.0330 
 
(0.0538) (0.0499) (0.0485) (0.0484) (0.1218) (0.0482) 
finished full time education 17 -0.0956 -0.1407** -0.0923 -0.0858 -0.1799 -0.0883 
 
(0.0660) (0.0632) (0.0628) (0.0628) (0.1574) (0.0624) 
finished full time education 18 -0.1388** 
-
0.1975*** -0.1428** -0.1334** -0.2521 -0.1331** 
 
(0.0612) (0.0639) (0.0623) (0.0633) (0.1392) (0.633) 
finished ft educ. 19 or still at school -0.1157* 
-
0.1729*** -0.0974* -0.0851 -0.2657 -0.0882 
 
(0.0609) (0.0591) (0.0574) (0.0582) (0.1371) (0.058) 
university degree -0.1478** 
-
0.2090*** -0.1218** -0.1056* 0.0237 -0.1054* 
 
(0.0601) (0.0618) (0.0608) (0.0619) (0.1341) (0.0616) 
postgraduate 
-
0.1687*** 
-
0.2477*** -0.1505** -0.1291** -0.1167 -0.1333** 
 
(0.0634) (0.0672) (0.0639) (0.0641) (0.1314) (0.0638) 
date partisanship measured 2010 2010 2010 2010 2005 2010 
Always included: constant, respondent's party id, income, gender, age and age squared   
Fixed effects Region Const Const Const Const Const 
Observations 3247 3115 3013 3097 596 3097 
R-squared 0.2080 
0.0614 
(w) 
0.1039 
(w) 
0.1086 
(w) 0.1318 0.1101 
Note: R-squared referred to within variation when constituency fixed effects are included. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. In column 1 (specification without constituency fixed effects) we also include all 
constituency-level variables and cluster the standard errors at the constituency level 
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Table 8. Involvement perception and voting behaviour (British Election Study) 
Dep. Variable  voted for the party of the incumbent MP 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
perceived involvement 
(continuous) 
-
0.0386
*** 
 
-
0.0372
*** 
 
-
0.0452
*** 
 
-
0.0401
*** 
 
 
(0.0071
) 
 
(0.0082
) 
 
(0.0088
) 
 
(0.0100
) 
 
perceived involvement 
(binary) 
 
-
0.0656
*** 
 
-
0.0610
*** 
 
-
0.0758
*** 
 
-
0.0685
*** 
  
(0.0138
) 
 
(0.0157
) 
 
(0.0167
) 
 
(0.0191
) 
voted for current MP in 
previous election 
0.2835
*** 
0.2841
*** 
0.3002
*** 
0.3012
*** 
0.2818
*** 
0.2823
*** 
0.3020
*** 
0.3025
*** 
 
(0.0231
) 
(0.0232
) 
(0.0262
) 
(0.0262
) 
(0.0240
) 
(0.0241
) 
(0.0271
) 
(0.0272
) 
partisan match 
0.4863
*** 
0.4887
*** 
0.4783
*** 
0.4797
*** 
0.4902
*** 
0.4928
*** 
0.4814
*** 
0.4829
*** 
 
(0.0250
) 
(0.0251
) 
(0.0267
) 
(0.0268
) 
(0.0258
) 
(0.0259
) 
(0.0273
) 
(0.0273
) 
 
                
constituency and MP control 
variables 
yes yes yes yes no no no no 
individual control variables yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  
fixed effects region region region region const const const  const 
sample includes 
constituencies where 
incumbent MP is not 
standing 
yes  yes  no no yes  yes  no no 
Observations 3169 3169 2526 2526 3044 3044 2429 2429 
R-squared 0.5163 0.5154 0.5223 0.5214 0.5082 0.5074 0.5146 0.5141 
     
(within) (within) (within) (within) 
Note. All regressions contain a constant and constituency and individual control variables (see table 7 for a 
complete list). In regressions with constituency fixed effects (columns 5-8) only constituencies with at least four 
observations are kept. There are 316 constituency fixed effects in columns 5 and 6 and 252 in columns 7 and 8. 
Region fixed effects consists of the 11 UK standard regions. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1. In specifications without constituency fixed effects, standard errors are clustered at the 
constituency level. 
Table 9. Total expenses news reporting 
 
dependent variable:  scandal-related news coverage 8 May - 8 August 2009  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
news-pre 0.5223*** 0.4729*** 0.4731*** 0.4550*** 0.4518*** 0.4580*** 0.4685*** 0.4517*** 
 
(0.0306) (0.039) (0.039) (0.048) (0.039) (0.047) (0.039) (0.048) 
Legg-money 0.0638 0.0480*** 0.0479*** 0.0519*** 0.0469*** 0.0535*** 
  
 
(0.0126) (0.013) (0.013) (0.016) (0.013) (0.016) 
  conservative MP 
 
0.0703 0.0520 -0.0686 0.1191 -0.3254 -0.0591 -0.2590 
  
(0.119) (0.134) (0.169) (0.138) (0.205) (0.158) (0.210) 
libdem MP 
 
-0.1336 -0.1476 -0.0334 0.0378 -0.1976 -0.1198 -0.0715 
  
(0.152) (0.158) (0.197) (0.148) (0.288) (0.188) (0.258) 
other MP 
 
0.2673 0.2222 0.3091 0.2633 0.4845** 0.1908 0.1242 
  
(0.192) (0.200) (0.207) (0.197) (0.214) (0.279) (0.290) 
female 
 
0.3916*** 0.4103*** 0.5544*** 0.4157*** 0.5788*** 0.4073*** 0.5485*** 
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(0.107) (0.110) (0.154) (0.109) (0.156) (0.109) (0.153) 
age 
 
0.0016 0.0026 0.0034 0.0039 0.0049 0.0027 0.0037 
  
(0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.007) (0.009) (0.007) (0.009) 
seniority 
 
0.0288*** 0.0265*** 0.0286*** 0.0255*** 0.0306*** 0.0259*** 0.0275*** 
  
(0.008) (0.009) (0.010) (0.008) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) 
degree 
 
0.1467 0.1469 0.2651** 0.1382 0.2918** 0.1395 0.2482* 
  
(0.107) (0.107) (0.129) (0.106) (0.133) (0.107) (0.132) 
oxbridge 
 
-0.0555 -0.0554 0.0234 -0.0295 0.0103 -0.0571 0.0321 
  
(0.114) (0.114) (0.148) (0.114) (0.148) (0.115) (0.150) 
marginal in 2005 
  
-0.1410 -0.1990 -0.1480 
 
-0.1438 -0.1784 
   
(0.116) (0.140) (0.116) 
 
(0.115) (0.139) 
turnout in 2005 
  
-0.0003 0.0076 -0.0008 0.0129 -0.0008 0.0063 
   
(0.009) (0.012) (0.009) (0.013) (0.009) (0.013) 
distance from Westm. 
  
0.0011 0.0000 0.0012 -0.0001 0.0011 -0.0000 
   
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
front-bench 
 
0.5589*** 0.5545*** 0.4902** 
 
0.5244** 0.5598*** 0.4975** 
  
(0.178) (0.179) (0.244) 
 
(0.245) (0.18) (0.2480) 
conserv frontbench 
    
0.4414* 
   
     
(0.259) 
   labour frontbench 
    
0.9641*** 
   
     
(0.239) 
   labour marginal 
     
-0.4794** 
  
      
(0.194) 
  conservative marginal 
     
0.2753 
  
      
(0.235) 
  libdem marginal 
     
-0.0097 
  
      
(0.337) 
  other marginal 
     
-0.7656** 
  
      
(0.355) 
  Legg money x Lab 
      
0.0397*** 0.0325 
       
(0.015) (0.020) 
Legg money x Con 
      
0.0681*** 0.0830*** 
       
(0.025) (0.029) 
Legg money x Libdem 
      
0.0248 0.0395 
       
(0.038) (0.047) 
Legg money x Other 
      
0.0481 0.0873 
       
(0.056) (0.059) 
Constant 0.8177 0.2950 0.2042 -0.3207 0.1617 -0.6603 0.2895 -0.1381 
  (0.0833) (0.397) (0.682) (0.900) (0.678) (0.910) (0.697) (0.928) 
Sample All All All Restricted All Restricted All Restricted 
Observations 600 600 600 370 600 370 600 370 
R-squared 0.3702 0.4375 0.4408 0.4608 0.4527 0.4733 0.4423 0.4650 
Note: Data do not include MPs from Northern Ireland and other MPs (details in the text). The restricted sample only includes MPs whose 
constituency boundaries changed by less than 10% according to Ralling and Thrusher (2007). Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 10. Coverage of the scandal by newspaper (SURE estimates)   
variable natural log of total expenses news (May 2009-May2010) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
newspaper telegraph times guardian indep. scotsman sun daily mail 
        
news-pre 0.1159*** 0.1680*** 0.2317*** 0.1761*** 0.1681*** 0.1799*** 0.1706*** 
 
(0.023) (0.024) (0.026) (0.024) (0.025) (0.022) (0.024) 
Legg-money 0.0341*** 0.0560*** 0.0321*** 0.0351*** 0.0325*** 0.0383*** 0.0395*** 
 
(0.008) (0.011) (0.010) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) 
cons. backbench 0.1455 0.0912 0.1719 0.0570 0.0905 0.1593 0.0943 
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(0.090) (0.123) (0.108) (0.095) (0.089) (0.102) (0.092) 
cons. frontbench 0.4849*** 0.7184*** 0.4337* 0.4892** 0.5416*** 0.4798** 0.3317* 
 
(0.185) (0.251) (0.221) (0.194) (0.181) (0.209) (0.188) 
labour frontbench 1.1262*** 1.3965*** 1.3074*** 1.1852*** 0.9176*** 0.9648*** 1.1651*** 
 
(0.128) (0.173) (0.152) (0.133) (0.123) (0.143) (0.130) 
libdem 0.1803 0.0972 0.3060** 0.0700 0.1550 -0.0605 0.2130* 
 
(0.114) (0.155) (0.136) (0.120) (0.112) (0.128) (0.116) 
other -0.1323 0.2004 0.4475** 0.1845 0.2535 -0.0217 0.0377 
 
(0.173) (0.236) (0.207) (0.182) (0.171) (0.196) (0.177) 
female 0.1569** 0.2560** 0.2604*** 0.1634** 0.1196 0.2440*** 0.1683** 
 
(0.077) (0.105) (0.092) (0.081) (0.076) (0.087) (0.079) 
age 0.0020 -0.0040 -0.0034 -0.0060 -0.0079* 0.0027 0.0029 
 
(0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
seniority 0.0168*** 0.0314*** 0.0295*** 0.0248*** 0.0225*** 0.0145** 0.0101* 
 
(0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) 
degree 0.0753 0.0942 0.1048 0.0166 0.0814 0.1453 0.0510 
 
(0.080) (0.108) (0.095) (0.084) (0.078) (0.090) (0.081) 
oxbridge 0.1293* 0.1452 0.0547 0.1330* 0.0933 0.0391 0.0598 
 
(0.073) (0.100) (0.088) (0.077) (0.072) (0.083) (0.075) 
marginal in 2005 -0.0456 -0.1309 -0.1449 -0.0899 -0.0621 -0.0891 -0.1691** 
 
(0.075) (0.102) (0.089) (0.079) (0.073) (0.084) (0.076) 
turnout in 2005 -0.0061 0.0003 -0.0023 -0.0036 -0.0022 0.0044 -0.0035 
 
(0.006) (0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) 
distance from 
parl. 0.0012* 0.0006 -0.0002 0.0006 0.0007 0.0011 0.0005 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Constant 0.6365 0.0777 0.2717 0.5378 0.3144 -0.7470 0.2578 
  (0.455) (0.619) (0.546) (0.478) (0.448) (0.515) (0.465) 
Observations 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 
R-squared 0.3248 0.3507 0.3803 0.3562 0.3558 0.3522 0.3452 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
Table A1: Newspaper Readership (2009-2010) 
National daily newspapers Total copies (thousands) Share 
  The Sun              7700 15.5 
  Daily Mail           4739 9.5 
  Daily Mirror/Record 4004 8 
  The Daily Telegraph  1751 3.5 
  The Times            1613 3.2 
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  Daily Star           1551 3.1 
  Daily Express        1423 2.9 
  The Guardian         1130 2.3 
  The Independent      556 1.1 
  Financial Times      391 8 
   Regional daily newspapers (outside London) 
   Press & Jnl-Ab'deen  207 0.4 
  Yorkshire Post       177 0.4 
  Cour & Adtsr-Dundee  168 0.3 
  The Herald-Scotland  145 0.3 
  The Scotsman         131 0.3 
Evening Times-Glasgw 151 0.3 
   Sunday newspapers 
    News of the World    7628 15.3 
  The Mail on Sunday   4974 10 
  Sunday Mirror        3816 7.7 
  The Sunday Times     3050 6.1 
  Sunday Express       1518 3 
  The Sunday Telegraph 1518 3 
  The People           1291 2.6 
  Sunday Mail          1109 22 
  The Observer         1078 22 
  Daily Star Sunday    941 19 
  The Sunday Post      799 16 
  The Independent on Sunday 594 12 
  Scotland on Sunday   191 4 
  Sunday Herald-Scot   142 0.3 
Source: National Readership Survey 
 
Table A2: Description of variables and summary statistics (constituencies and MPs) 
 n Mean s.d. min max 
Indicators of involvement in the scandal      
Total mentions of MP name+expenses, 8 May 2009 - 7 Aug 2010 359 27.03 59.35 0 563 
Total mentions of MP name, 8 Feb - 7 May 2009 359 38.94 113.43 0 1387 
Money owed according to Legg Report minus amount reduced in 
appeal 
359 1568.94 4375.44 0 42458.21 
MP voting behaviour      
Number of loyal votes between 1 June 2008 and 7 May 2009 
[loyal_before] 
359 164.70 39.57 0 238 
Number of vote rebellions between 1 June 2008 and 7 May 2009 
[rebel_before] 
359 4.41 5.83 0 52 
Number of missed votes between 1 June 2008 and 7 May 2009 
[absent_before] 
359 81.73 37.54 10 252 
Number of loyal votes between 8 May 2009 and 1 May 2010 
[loyal_after] 
359 173.03 47.40 0 256 
Number of vote rebellions between 8 May 2009 and 1 May 2010 
[rebel_after] 
359 1.51 5.02 0 57 
Number of missed votes between 8 May 2009 and 1 May 2010 
[absent_after] 
359 92.86 44.75 5 269 
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Media coverage      
Mentions of MP name in The Daily Telegraph - 8 Feb 2009 to 7 
May 2009 [telegraph0] 
359 4.09 13.38 0 171 
Mentions of MP name in The Times - 8 Feb 2009 to 7 May 2009 
[times0] 
359 10.33 30.29 0 307 
Mentions of MP name in The Independent - 8 Feb 2009 to 7 May 
2009 [independent0] 
359 3.78 11.69 0 126 
Mentions of MP name in The Guardian - 8 Feb 2009 to 7 May 
2009 [guardian0] 
359 5.49 15.74 0 192 
Mentions of MP name in The Scotsman - 8 Feb 2009 to 7 May 
2009 [scotsman0] 
359 3.60 18.72 0 312 
Mentions of MP name in The Sun - 8 Feb 2009 to 7 May 2009 
[sun0] 
359 6.81 24.13 0 328 
Mentions of MP name in The Daily Mail - 8 Feb 2009 to 7 May 
2009 [dailymail0] 
359 4.84 14.31 0 210 
Mentions of MP name + EXPENSES in The Daily Telegraph - 8 
May 2009 to 7 August 2009 [telegraph] 
359 4.12 8.41 0 80 
Mentions of MP name + EXPENSES in The Times - 8 May 2009 
to 7 August 2009 [times] 
359 6.62 15.39 0 139 
Mentions of MP name + EXPENSES in The Independent - 8 May 
2009 to 7 August 2009 [independent] 
359 3.14 6.93 0 55 
Mentions of MP name + EXPENSES in The Guardian - 8 May 
2009 to 7 August 2009 [guardian] 
359 4.43 10.15 0 86 
Mentions of MP name + EXPENSES in The Scotsman - 8 May 
2009 to 7 August 2009 [scotsman] 
359 2.49 5.73 0 54 
Mentions of MP name + EXPENSES in The Sun - 8 May 2009 to 
7 August 2009 [sun] 
359 3.35 8.46 0 94 
Mentions of MP name + EXPENSES in The Daily Mail - 8 May 
2009 to 7 August 2009 [dailymail] 
359 2.88 7.73 0 87 
Individual charecteristics of MPs      
Age in years in 2009 [age]         359 54.91 9.28 29 79 
Years in Parliament in 2009 [seniority] 359 13.30 8.12 4 45 
Variables referred to electoral constituency      
Difference of party vote-share between 2005 and 2010 [dparty] 356 -1.72 7.12 -
18.63 
16.84 
Winning majority % in the 2005 general election [maj05] 359 17.82 11.86 0.03 58.39 
Distance from constituency office to Parliament [distance] 359 161.26 143.10 0 702 
Voter turnout in MP constituency in 2005 election [turn05] 359 61.71 5.77 37.62 76.43 
% boundary change since 2005 election  359 2.93 3.17 0 10 
The table continues on the next page. See note at the end of table. 
 
Table A2 (continued) 
 n Mean 
Binary variables 0 (no) 1 (yes) 
Labour MP [lab] 193 166 
Conservative MP [con] 242 117 
Liberal Democrat MP [libdem] 320 39 
MP from other party [other] 349 10 
Labour, Conservative or Liberal Democrat front bench on 7 May 2009 [front07052009] 313 46 
Labour, Conservative or Liberal Democrat front bench on 11 April 2005 
[front11042005] 
319 40 
Labour, Conservative or Liberal Democrat front bench on 12 April 2010 
[front12042010] 
312 47 
MP stood down, resigned or was deselected between May 2009 and the 2010 general 
election [ret_affected] 
310 49 
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MP stood down, resigned or was deselected before May 2009 [ret_notaff] 332 27 
Female MP 294 65 
MP has university degree  75 284 
MP graduated from Oxford or Cambridge 256 103 
Constituency with < 10% majority in 2005 election (marginal) 253 106 
Constituency boundary change since 2005 election 122 237 
Note. The number of observations (n) refers to the sample most commonly used in our regressions.  We exclude 
abolished constituencies, constituencies where retiring MPs were replaced by sitting MPs for the 2010 election, 
Northern Ireland constituencies and constituencies with a boundary change greater than 10%. The PublicWhip 
profiles for each MP were used to identify which Members were on the front bench for Labour, Conservatives, or 
Liberal Democrats by compiling data on whether individuals had roles containing the following words: Minister of 
State; Foreign Secretary; Home Secretary; Chancellor; and Prime Minister. This would also include Shadow 
equivalents, such as “Leader of the Opposition” and “Shadow Chancellor”. The lists of front bench members for 
the three main political parties were compiled for three dates: 5 April 2005 (the date the 2001-5 Parliament was 
dissolved); 7 May 2009 (the date before The Telegraph publication of detailed MP expenses); and 12 April 2010 
(the date that the 2005-10 Parliament was dissolved). 
 
 
Table A3: Description of variables and summary statistics (British Election Study) 
 
Variable n Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      perceived involvement (continuous) 3247 2.439 3.381 0 11 
perceived involvement (binary) 3247 0.425 0.494 0 1 
voted for the party of incumbent MP 3169 0.441 0.497 0 1 
voted for the MP in 2005 3247 0.484 0.5 0 1 
income 3247 7.261 3.666 1 16 
gender (male) 3247 0.567 0.496 0 1 
trust others 3247 5.895 2.17 0 10 
attention to politics 3247 7.107 2.064 0 10 
age 3247 53.978 13.094 21 90 
partisan match 3247 0.394 0.489 0 1 
Respondent thinks most MPs are corrupt 3097 2.221 1.208 0 4 
press usage 3097 3.343 1.472 1 5 
television usage 3097 3.331 1.106 1 5 
internet usage 3097 2.158 0.761 1 3 
  n %       
education 
     finished full time education 15 or younger 421 13.52 
   finished full time education 16 687 22.05 
   finished full time education 17 306 9.82 
   finished full time education 18 382 12.26 
   finished ft educ. 19 or still at school 408 13.1 
   university degree 519 16.66 
   postgraduate 392 12.58       
      party identification 
     Labour 995 31.94 
   Conservative 926 29.73 
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Liberal Democratic 406 13.03 
   Other 376 12.07 
   None 412 13.23       
      democracy satisfaction 
     very satisfied 171 5.49 
   fairly satisfied 1,248 40.06 
   little dissatisfied 1,053 33.8 
   very dissatisfied 643 20.64 
   Note: the sample size (n) refers to the largest number of observations used for a specific variable among the 
various specifications 
 
 
 
HIGHLIGHTS 
• We provide an empirical study of democratic accountability by using data from the 2009 UK 
expenses scandal 
• Corrupt politicians are mostly removed at the pre-election stage: this explains why elections 
seem to have little effect 
• Information availability is crucial for democratic accountability. Partisanship, however, also 
matters 
• The British press did not display any particular partisan bias in covering the scandal 
• Female MPs attracted more press coverage and, for the same amount of coverage, were 
more likely to stand down 
 
 
Figure 1. The democratic accountability process
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Figure 1. The democratic accountability process
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Figure 3: Key channels in the accountability process: quantifying the effects on observables
Note: Squares and normal arrows refer to MP-level variables, circles and bold arrows  to individual  level variables (from BES). Numbers reported are 
approximations  to the second decimal from our favourite specifications.  A one standard deviation change refers to a change in the explanatory variable, the 
effect on dependent variables is expressed in percentages and reported next to arrows.  For log-linear regressions we use the approximation        .
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